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United States Patents Claiming Foreign Filing Dates as
References Against United States, Patent Applications
A patent will not be issued for a claimed invention that is known or
in the public domain.' Recently the Patent Office has reversed its prior
procedure and has, under certain conditions, treated as constructive public
knowledge in the United States a patent application on file and held in
secret in a foreign country. This procedure was questioned in Application
of Hilmer,' and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Brenner,' with the two lower courts
reaching opposite results. Recently the D.C. Circuit, in reversing Lilly,'
approved the reasoning of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.) in Hilmer that a United States patent application could be
used only as a prior art reference as of its United States filing date and
not from its earlier foreign priority date.
The instant problem concerns statutory construction of sections 102 (a)
and 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 and, more specifically, sections 102 (e)
and 119. Sections 102 (a)- (g) and 103 state specific conditions for patent-
ability. An applicant is denied a patent if he has not fulfilled the require-
ments of novelty or invention, i.e., if his invention is disclosed by or is
obvious in view of prior art references. Section 102(a)" provides that
knowledge or use of the invention in the United States or its description
in a publication anywhere in the world before the applicant's claimed
date of invention constitutes prior art and will defeat a claim to a patent.
Section 103' requires that the claimed invention not be obvious in light
of the prior art. The primary and usual source of prior art references is
the more than three million United States patents that have been issued
to date. No statutory provision defeats the right to a patent because of
knowledge or use in a foreign country.
Section 102 (e)' makes a United States patent available as a prior art
reference (to show knowledge by others) as of the filing date of the
application in the United States rather than the later date of patent issu-
ance when the disclosures in the application are actually made public.
Specifically section 102 (e) provides: "A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless ... (e) the invention was described in a patent granted on
an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, ...
'35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1964).
2359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
a 2 4 8 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1965).
4 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
2 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1964). This section states: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, . . ."
635 U.S.C. § 103 (1964). This section states: "A patent may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."
735 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1964).
'Ibid. (Emphasis added.).
Section 119" alone does not present conditions for patentability and does
not present a source of prior art. This section is used by an inventor who
has previously filed an application in a foreign country and within one
year files an application for the same invention in the United States. When
filing in the United States, the inventor's application is given the benefit
of the earlier filing date in the foreign country. This assures that knowl-
edge of others or disclosures by himself or others which occur between the
foreign and United States filing, and which would normally constitute
prior art, will not be used to defeat the inventor's application in the
United States.
The problem at hand concerns recent attempts by the Patent Office
to change the stated meaning of section 102 (e) by reading it in con-
junction with section 119. Under such a construction a United States
patent given a priority date under section 119 would be available as a
prior art reference from its foreign filing date rather than from its actual
United States filing date.
I. BACKGROUND
The question of which date, the foreign priority date or the actual
United States filing date, was the effective date of a United States patent
as a prior art reference first"0 arose in 1935. In Viviani v. Taylor v. Her-
zog,"5 Commissioner of Patents Coe ruled that the relevant filing date is
the actual United States filing date, not the foreign priority date. The
commissioner stated:
Section 4887 R.S. [now section 119] does not concern itself with bars
against issuance of patents in this country, such bars being found in section
4886 R.S. [now section 102] (U.S.C., title 35, section 31) . . . In view of
the origin of that paragraph of the section, it is believed to have the same
meaning as if it had read, 'shall have the same force and effect, in so far as
applicant's right to a patent is concerned.' This statutory provision has no
bearing upon the right of another party to a patent except in the case of
an interference where the two parties are claiming the same invention. 2
Following Viviani the Patent Office promulgated section 715.01 of its
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure3 under which section it operated
935 U.S.C. § 119 (1964). See text of § 119 at note 33 infra.
1' Federal Yeast Corp. v. Fleischmann Co., 13 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1926) is sometimes cited as
the first case raising the instant problem. Fleischmann was an infringement suit concerning two
patents the validity of which was attacked. One of the patents had a foreign priority date, effective
under the World War I Nolan Act. The court determined that they were both for the same in-
vention and owned by the same person and could not both be valid. This case is dismissed as no
authority for the instant problem since there is much dispute as to what the case stands for other
than that there cannot be two valid patents for the same invention. Also, since the case was a
priority dispute, both inventors would have the benefit of their foreign priority date.
" 72 U.S.P.Q. 448 (Pat. Off. Bd. of App. 1935).
12 Id. at 449.
3 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE S 715.01 (1949). This section provided:
In overcoming, under Rule 131, a domestic patent where the patentee has an earlier
foreign filing date to which he would be entitled in establishing priority to the in-
vention claimed in the patent, it is not necessary for the applicant to carry his date




until recently. 4 Two later cases mentioned and apparently followed the
Viviani rule." In 1954"0 the C.C.P.A. also indicated that the reference
patent could be used only from its United States filing date. However, in
1964 a district court in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Knapp-Monarch Co." re-
versed the trend. The court therein stated by footnote that the wording
in section 119 gives status to an application, as distinguished from a mere
benefit to an applicant, based on the foreign filing date.'" This "status" was
said to be the same status that an ordinary United States patent has as of
its United States filing date; therefore, the questioned patent was available
as a prior art reference as of the foreign priority date. Sperry Rand did
not explain the reasoning behind the decision and did not mention Viviani
or section 715.01 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. On re-
hearing," the court stated that there was sufficient prior art in two other
patents, so that the patent in issue did not have any substantial effect on
the outcome of the suit.
II. THE RECENT CONFLICT
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Application of Hilmer,"
decided four months after the district court decision in Lilly, declined to
follow the "status" theory offered therein. The primary reference relied
on by the examiner was a patent granted to Habicht, who had filed in
Switzerland on January 24, 1957, and in the United States on January 23,
1958. Hilmer filed application in Germany on July 31, 1957, and in
the United States on July 25, 1958. The patent examiner rejected Hilmer's
claims" citing the Habicht patent (as of its foreign filing date) as the
primary prior art reference. The Board of Appeals affirmed" the patent
examiner, and Hilmer appealed to the C.C.P.A., contending that the
Habicht patent could be used as a prior art reference only from its United
States filing date as provided in section 102 (e). He further contended
that he had overcome that later date, having the benefit of his German
filing date under section 119 and that, therefore, his claims could not be
rejected. Held, reversed:"' Section 119 gives a personal privilege to the in-
' On May 27, 1964, a commissioner's order was issued (803 O.G. Pat. Off. 305), stating that
"Section 715.01 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure is no longer controlling in view of
recent decisions of the Board of Appeals."
"SCelanese Corp. of America v. Ribbon Narrow Fabrics Co., 117 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1941)
dealt with the issue with the court concluding as to which of the dates should control that "that
is immaterial." Young v. General Elec. Co., 96 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1951) also dealt with this
issue and concluded that "Whether [the] Bethenod [patent] be regarded as prior art in this case
makes little or no difference. There is a wealth of prior art without it." Id. at 136.
16Application of Walker, 213 F.2d 332 (C.C.P.A. 1954).
17 193 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
"Id. at 758.
19 Ibid.
"0359 F.2d 859 (1966), 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 137.
3 Hilmer's claims were rejected for obviousness under § 103.
sa The Board of Appeals opinion in Application of Hilmer is reprinted in the appendix of the
C.C.P.A. opinion in 149 U.S.P.Q. 480 (Pat. Off. Bd. of App. 1966).
23 59 F.2d at 877, 878. The Hilmer court stated that:
[S]ection 119 must be interpreted as giving only a positive right or benefit to an
applicant who has first filed abroad to protect him against possible intervening patent-
defeating events in obtaining a patent. . . . [It has no effect on the effective date




ventor only. It does not create a new type of prior art reference and does
not alter the provision of section 102 (e) that an application is available
as a prior art reference only as of its United States filing date. Application
of Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Brenner," decided by the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in 1965, four months before the Hilmer decision in the
C.C.P.A., followed the "status" theory. The reference was a patent to
Feather which was filed first in Great Britain and then, within one year,
in the United States with a right of priority claimed under section 119.
While these applications were pending, the plaintiff's assignor filed an
application in the United States for an invention disclosed but not claimed
in the Feather application. The plaintiff was able to prove a date of in-
vention prior to Feather's United States filing date but after Feather's
British filing date. The plaintiff contended that he had shown a date of
invention prior to Feather's United States filing date, as required by
section 102 (e), and thus that the patent to Feather could not be cited
by the patent examiner as a prior art reference to defeat his claim. Upon
rejection of his claims by the patent examiner and affirmation by the
Board of Appeals, the plaintiff brought suit in the district court. Held,
Claims refused:2" The wording of section 119 gives a foreign application
the status of a United States application for all purposes. When sections
119 and 102 (e) are read together, a foreign application given priority
under section 119 is available as a prior art reference as of its foreign
filing date. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Brenner, 248 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1965).
This holding was then reversed by the D.C. Circuit with little discussion
of the issue other than to conclude that the holding of Hilmer "presents
the better alternative notwithstanding the vigorous and cogent arguments
to the contrary .... " Ely Lilly & Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
III. ANALYSIS
Section 102 (e) is one of the claim-defeating statutes. This section is
closely related in fact and history to the requirement of section 102 (a)
which prohibits a patent if "(a) the invention was known or used by
others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication
in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent . . . . Section 102 (e) is a result of a construction of section
'248 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1965), 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 590 (1966).
"Specifically the court stated that the words "filed in the United States" [of § 102(e)]
could include a constructive, or legal, United States filing date obtained by filing a
previous application in a foreign country and claiming a right of priority based on
the foreign application. . . . [§ 119] provides a status to a United States application
of a foreign inventor. . .. Once this status attaches to the application, it is there
permanently, both offensively for the invention claimed by the foreign inventor and
defensively for whatever he discloses. . . . [T]he foreign filing date is the effective
reference date as to all subject matter which is disclosed, whether claimed or not, in
the foreign application.
Id. at 408, 410, 422, 423.
2635 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
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102(a)'s predecessor, R.S. 4886, 2 by the Supreme Court in Alexander
Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville" in 1926. The defendant in a patent
infringement suit contended that the plaintiff's patent was invalid since
he had not been the first inventor. The defendant showed that the same
invention had been disclosed in an application co-pending with the plain-
tiff's application and filed prior to that of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
argued that the co-pending application could not be used to show prior
knowledge in the United States since the contents of the application were
secret" and thus, the invention was not "known or used by others in
this country, before his invention or discovery thereof." The Supreme
Court held the plaintiff's patent invalid, reasoning that the application was
proof that the invention was "known in this country" before plaintiff's
date of invention. The Milburn rule was enacted into statute as section
102 (e) of the Patent Act of 1952. The effect of section 102 (e) as reflected
in Milburn"° and in the Reviser's Notea' is to make a U.S. patent available
as a reference as of its U.S. filing date. Neither Milburn nor section 102 (e)
dealt with use of a foreign patent as a reference. In fact, Justice Holmes
stated in Milburn: "The policy of the statute as to foreign inventions
obviously stands on its own footing and cannot be applied to domestic
affairs. ' ' "a
Section 119 is entitled "Benefit of earlier filing date in foreign country;
right of priority."'" The present wording of the section is substantially
unchanged from that of the second paragraph of its predecessor statute
27 R.S. 4886, 16 Stat. 201, ch. 230 (1870). There was no change in R.S. 4886 in its reenact-
ment in the Patent Act of 1952 other than to divide the former statute into lettered paragraphs.
'270 U.S. 390 (1926).
29 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1964) generally provides that the applications for a patent shall be kept
secret by the Patent Office.
3a Milburn established the rule that a U.S. patent was available as an anticipation reference under
R.S. 4886 (now § 102) as of its U.S. filing date. Hazeltine Research v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252
(1966) extended this rule making an application available as of its U.S. filing date as a prior art
reference for obviousness under § 103. This extension was criticized in Belkin, More Comments on
Section 103, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 123 (1966), using a reasoning analogous to that used in
criticisms of the Milburn rule, i.e., since the statute requires that the invention as a whole must
be unobvious to one skilled in the art, would not the lack of availability of the patent application
have some bearing on the issue?
' Reviser's Notes to the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C.A. § 102, at 446 (1952). This note,
released at the time of enactment of § 102 (e) states: "Paragraph (e) is new and enacts the rule
of Milburn v. Davis-Bournonville, 270 U.S. 390, by reason of which a United States patent dis-
closing an invention dates from the date of filing the application for the purpose of anticipating
a subsequent inventor."
aa 2 7 0 U.S. 390, 402 (1926).
a335 U.S.C. § 119 (1964). Section 119, in part, provides:
§ 119. Benefit of earlier filing date in foreign country; right of priority
An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person
who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an
application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign country which affords
similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United States or to citizens
of the United States, shall have the same effect as the same application would have
if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent for the same
invention was first filed in such foreign country, if the application in this country
is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such foreign application
was filed; .
(Emphasis added.)
R.S. 4887,H which was added to that statute in 1903. This addition was
necessary to effectuate the United States' signing of the International
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,"5 an attempt to
seek greater patent protection for inventors throughout the world.' The
Commission that studied the International Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property made several references" to the "delay of priority"
or "right of priority" referred to in the convention, explaining the need
for such a priority to prevent intervening acts from defeating an appli-
cant trying to obtain a patent in more than one country. The Commis-
sion recommended that "an amendment to the law should be made, pro-
viding that the foreign application shall have, in case an application is
filed in this country within the specified period, the same effect as if filed
here on the day it was filed abroad." 8 Thus, the words "same effect"
were originally intended to give protection to one who was trying to
obtain a patent. There was no mention of the use of a patent as a reference
by the Patent Office to bar an application by a third party. Subsequently
the words "shall have the same effect" were used in the predecessor statute
R.S. 4887"' and were carried through to section 119 with passage of the
Patent Act of 1952.Y
The meaning given by Congress to R.S. 4887 is clear. Due to World
War II conditions, the one-year right of priority was not felt sufficient to
protect inventors in 1946. The Boykin Act4' was passed to extend tempo-
rarily this time period. House Report No. 1498 accompanying the pro-
posed bill to extend the period of priority existing under R.S. 4887 states
that "the phrase 'shall have the same force and effect' is intended to mean
'shall have the same force and effect,' etc., insofar as applicant's right
to a patent is concerned. This statutory provision has no bearing upon
the right of another party to a patent except in the case of an interference
where the two parties are claiming the same patentable invention. ' ' This
report clearly shows that the oft-quoted words have not meant to Con-
gress "same force and effect" for all purposes. They are limited to giving
a benefit to an applicant.
34R.S. 4887, Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1019, § 1, 32 Stat. 1225. Prior to this addition in
1903 there was no mention of right of priority or "shall have the same effect" in R.S. 4887. For
the earlier wording see 16 Star. 198, ch. 230 (1870).
" International Convention For The Protection Of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, Lisbon
Revision Oct. 31, 1958, 53 Star. 1748 (1939). For a historical background, see LADAS, HARVARD
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, No. 2, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY (1930); Briskin, Foreign Priority Rights Under Section 119 of the Patent Act of 1952,
39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 94, 98-108 (1957).
asAct of June 4, 1898, 30 Stat. 431. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED To
REVISE THE LAws RELATING TO PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND TRADE NAMES, WITH REFERENCE
TO EXISTING CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES (1902).
aTREPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, Op. Cit. supra note 36, at 6, 12, 14, 19.
"8 Id. at 24. (Emphasis added.)
3' Supra note 34.
4°Frederico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 29 (1952) states: "This so-
called right of priority was provided for in the second paragraph of R.S. 4887 which is the basis
for the first paragraph of section 119 of this title. . . . The new statute made no changes in these
conditions of the corresponding part of the old statute except to revise the language slightly."
(Emphasis added.)
4 1Boykin Act of Aug. 8, 1946, ch. 910, 60 Stat. 940.42H.R. REP. No. 1498, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
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Thus, while many contemporary writers,' including Judge Jackson in
the district court Lilly opinion, have put great emphasis on these words
of section 119 in reaching the conclusion that they give a patent applica-
tion a "status" as of its foreign filing date, it is clear that no such meaning
existed at least from 1903 until 1952. There have been no further changes
in section 119 or congressional expressions on this subject since 1952. 4
A fundamental change in the status of foreign applications as con-
templated by the lower court in Lilly would be a necessary step leading
toward an eventual world-wide patenting system. However, such a per-
vasive step in this area should be made only by Congress, not by judicial
construction. Further, such a change should be prospective only due to
the large number of patents issued under the previous construction. If
the "status" interpretation was adopted, the owners of many current
United States patents would find themselves holding potentially worth-
less patents since thousands of patents were issued under the interpretation
set out by Viviani between 1935 and 1964.
The "status" construction offered by the district court in Lilly has
been adopted by the proposed Patent Reform Act of 1967.4' Section
100 (f) " defines effective filing date of an application as the date to which
it is entitled under section 119. 47 Section 102 (b) 41 then requires that an
application must be on file before the effective filing date of a prior art
reference. It should be noted that this act for the first time definitely
sets out a "status" condition for a foreign application and, further, that
the act is only to be prospective in effect.9
While the possibility exists that Congress by the adoption of the Patent
Reform Act of 1967 may make the foreign priority date the effective
prior art reference date, the issue should now be settled with respect to
currently effective patents-the foreign priority date of a United States
patent can not be used as the effective date of a prior art reference against
a United States application.
Marcus Leslie Thompson, Jr.
'See Chasan & Rabin, Effective Filing Dates of U.S. Patents Based on 35 U.S.C. Sec. 119,
45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 601 (1963); Fishman, An Analysis of the Combined Effect of 35 USC
5 119 and 35 USC § 102(e), 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 181 (1964); Chasan, Commentaria, 47 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 922 (1965); See also Eli Lilly v. Brenner, 248 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1965).
For the opposite reasoning, see Currie, Re: "An Analysis of the Combined Effect of 35 USC
Section 119 and 35 USC Section 102(e)," 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 598 (1964); Samuels, Com-
mentary, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 827 (1964); Meyer, Are Patents Effective References as of For-
eign Filing Dates?, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 391 (1965).
"In Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) the Supreme Court stated: "Treasury
regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended
or substantially re-enacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have
the effect of law." The same statement can be applied to patent statutes and Patent Office regula-
tions.
'Proposed Patent Reform Act of 1967, S. REP,. No. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
40 Id. § 100(f). This section is entirely new.
41 Id. § 119. This section is substantially unchanged from 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1961).
4 Id. § 102(b). This section is entirely new.
41 See text of the proposed addition to the Judicial Code, a supplementary provision of the
Patent Reform Act of 1967, in 152 U.S.P.Q. 16 (1967).
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